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ABSTRACT: In this paper, we present a goal-directed proof procedure for abductive reasoning. This procedure will be 
compared with Aliseda’s approach based on semantic tableaux. We begin with some comments on Alis-
eda’s algorithms for computing conjunctive abductions and show that they do not entirely live up to their 
aims. Next we give a concise account of goal-directed proofs and we show that abductive explanations are 
a natural spin-off of these proofs. Finally, we show that the goal-directed procedure solves the problems 
we encountered in Aliseda’s algorithms. 
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1. Introduction 
Very few philosophers of science will object to the idea that abduction plays a key role 
in scientific reasoning. Still, the logical foundations of abduction have been seriously 
neglected, both by logicians and philosophers of science. For centuries, the former 
have discarded abduction as a fallacy (“affirming the consequent”), about which noth-
ing ‘decent’ can be said. The latter are usually more sympathetic to the concept, de-
spite (or, as is sometimes the case, thanks to) the fact that also they believe there is 
nothing logical about it. 
There is, however, a gradual change in attitude. Two developments seem impor-
tant for this. On the one hand, the advent of non-standard logics (especially non-
monotonic ones) made it possible to broaden the domain of logic to include all kinds 
of reasoning forms that are traditionally viewed as non-logical. On the other hand, 
abduction has been intensively studied within computer science and Artificial Intelli-
gence, which led to a large variety of logic-based approaches to abduction. 
Important as these developments are, the results are fragmented and their applica-
tion to problems of philosophy of science are often far from evident. Aliseda (2006) is 
a welcome exception to this. In this book, Aliseda presents a general framework for 
the logical study of abduction, that has roots in formal logic as well as computer sci-
ence, and shows how it can be applied to problems in the philosophy of science (such 
as explanation, empirical progress and epistemic change). We mention only a few ex-
amples of what we consider to be central contributions: the taxonomy for abduction 
(which is the most elaborated one available in the literature) and the analysis of the 
different “abductive styles”, the attention for “abductive anomaly” (which is too often 
ignored), and the structural characterization of abductive inference. In view of this, we 
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are convinced that the book will soon count as a standard reference for the study of 
abduction. 
The reader will forgive us for adding a personal note. For about ten years now, the 
first author has been convinced that abduction should be modelled as a kind of “for-
ward reasoning”, in which one tries to derive the explanations from the theory together 
with the explanandum.2 This resulted in a number of papers on formal logics for abduc-
tion that lead from a theory and one or more explananda to a set of possible explana-
tions (see, for instance, Meheus and Batens 2006). It is under the influence of Alis-
eda’s book that Meheus began to see a number of limitations to this particular ap-
proach and that she started to look elsewhere.3 This eventually led to a cooperation 
with the second author, who, for applications totally unrelated to abduction, had been 
working on a specific type of goal-directed proofs (see Batens and Provijn 2001). 
The goal-directed proofs from Batens and Provijn (2001) bear similarities with se-
mantic tableaux (which are at the heart of Aliseda’s computational approach to abduc-
tion). For instance, unlike ordinary proofs, these goal-directed proofs form a decision 
method for A1, … , An  B. Moreover, they are primarily based on the analysis of 
formulas. One of the differences is that, for most sets of premises, goal-directed 
proofs are more efficient (require less computation) than semantic tableaux. 
As it turns out, abductive explanations are a natural spin-off of goal-directed 
proofs. Moreover, they seem a nice compromise between forward and backward ap-
proaches: although the explanandum is not included among the premises, it is the start-
ing point of the derivation, and moreover directs the inferences that are made. 
In this paper, we shall present the basic ideas behind goal-directed proofs for ab-
duction and make some comparisons with Aliseda’s approach based on semantic tab-
leaux. We will necessarily have to be brief, but we refer the reader to Meheus and 
Provijn (To Appear) for a more detailed discussion.  
We begin with some comments on Aliseda’s approach, acknowledging at once 
that, in this very short contribution, we shall not be able to do justice to it. 
2. Abduction Through Semantic Tableaux 
In this section, we shall argue that Aliseda’s algorithms for computing conjunctive ab-
ductions by means of tableaux (Aliseda 2006, pp. 113-116) do not entirely live up to 
their aims: the procedures do not warrant that the generated explanations are non-
redundant (in the sense of the definition on p. 111) and that the one for consistent con-
junctive abductions moreover does not warrant consistency. 
We begin with the algorithm for conjunctive plain abductions (Aliseda, 2006, p. 
113). It is claimed in footnote 3 that the algorithm does not lead to redundant solu-
tions, because each conjunctive explanation is a conjunction of partial explanations. 
                                                     
2 Abduction is usually viewed as a kind of “backward reasoning”: “given an explanandum B and a theory T, 
find an explanation A such that B can be derived from T and A.” 
3 One limitation is that the logics seem suitable only one of Aliseda’s abductive styles, namely the one 
where one is interested in the minimal abductions. 
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However, in instruction 3 of the algorithm, conjunctions are constructed that contain 
one literal from each BPC(Γi );4 in the next and final instruction only repeated conjuncts 
are eliminated. Hence, there is no warrant that the conjunctions do not contain con-
juncts that, in view of the other conjuncts, are superfluous to close the tableau.5 Here 
is an example.6
Example 1.  Θ = {(( p ∧ q) ∧ r ) ⊃ s, (( p ∧ q) ∨ t ) ⊃ s} ϕ = s.  
The only non-redundant conjunctive explanation is p ∧ q, but also ( p ∧ q) ∧ r is gen-
erated. 
One way to remedy this first problem is to add an instruction that eliminates all non-
minimal conjunctions —we call an abductive solution ∧(Σ) minimal iff there is no 
Σ’ ⊂ Σ for which ∧(Σ’) is also an abductive solution. 
The procedure for conjunctive consistent explanations (p. 115) is plagued by the 
same problem. Actually, the problem is even worse, because now all possible conjunc-
tions of partial explanations are generated as abductive solutions. Moreover, although 
it is claimed that the “production of any inconsistency whatsoever” is avoided (Aliseda 
2006, pp. 114), the procedure does not warrant this. Here are but two examples —
note that in each case the theory is consistent and the explanandum is compatible with it. 
Example 2.  Θ = {p ⊃ q, r ∨ s} ϕ = q. 
The procedure leads to ∼r ∧ ∼s as a consistent explanation for q, which is incompati-
ble with r ∨ s. 
Example 3.  Θ = {p ⊃ q, (r ∧ ∼r) ⊃ q} ϕ = q. 
In view of the tautology (r ∧ ∼r ) ⊃ q, the contradiction r ∧ ∼r is obtained as a consistent 
explanation for q. 
The cause for this second problem is simple: even if the literals are compatible with 
the theory (which is checked in instruction 3), their conjunctions need not be. Hence, 
what is needed is an additional instruction in which those ρi from instruction 6 are 
selected for which T (Θ + ρi ) is a semi-closed extension. 
These additional instructions are needed also for another reason. On p. 116 it is 
claimed that, in order to modify the algorithms to handle the production of explanatory 
abductions, one only needs to avoid self-explanations (the case where the abductive 
                                                     
4 BPC(Γi) —the Branch Partial Closure of Γi — is the set of literals that close the open branch Γi but do 
not close all the other open branches of the tableau. 
5 According to Aliseda (personal communication), we are mistaken in not taking into account that what 
can be found on p. 113 of Aliseda (2006) is only a sketch of the algorithm as it is presented in Aliseda 
(1997) (see also the claims on p. 110 of Aliseda 2006). On her view, the redundancy problem does 
not occur because after the last instruction of the algorithm, the generated solutions have to be 
checked against the conditions listed in the output of the algorithm. 
6 We follow Aliseda’s convention to use Θ as metavariable for background theories and ϕ as a metavari-
able for explananda. 
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solution α is identical to the explanandum ϕ). Aliseda justifies this claim by her Fact 4 
—the idea that, given any Θ and ϕ, the algorithms never produce abductive solutions 
α such that α  ϕ. As in some cases abductive solutions will be generated that are 
internally inconsistent (see example 3), this Fact does not hold in general.7 It also does 
not hold true in general (as Atocha claims on p. 114) that the trivial solution (where 
α = ϕ) can be avoided by first running the algorithm for atomic explanations. The 
reason is that the algorithms for atomic explanations do not always rule out self-
explanations. For instance, where Θ = {s ⊃ p, p ⊃ s}, p is generated as an explanation 
for p. The following is a bit less obvious:8
Example 4.  Θ = {s ⊃ p, ( p ∧ (q ∨ r )) ⊃ s} ϕ = p.  
Not only s is produced as an explanation for p, but also p. 
 We end this section with a remark on the notion of “partial explanation”. On Alis-
eda’s account, given a theory Θ and explanandum ϕ, a formula β counts as a partial 
explanation for ϕ iff T ((Θ + ∼ϕ) + β) is semi-closed. This definition is one of the 
main reasons why, in the abductive solutions, irrelevant conjuncts may creep in: the 
definition does not warrant that there is any relation between the ‘partial explanation’ 
and the explanandum. One may respond to this that the problem disappears if only 
relevant premises are included in the theory. However, this is setting the cart before the 
horse. One of the main problems in searching for an abduction is precisely to identify 
the relevant premises. And, in all interesting cases, this problem is only solved when 
the abductive explanations have been generated. 
In Section 4, we shall see that this problem is dealt with in a very natural way by 
goal-directed proofs. But first we present a very brief introduction to the format, 
which was elaborated in Batens and Provijn (2001).  
3. Goal-Directed Proofs 
The basic idea is that the formal elements of the search process, involved in the con-
struction of a proof for Γ  G, are pushed in the proof itself. In this section, Γ always 
denotes the premise set and G is used to refer to the main goal of the search process. 
In a goal-directed proof, formulas are derived that have the following form 
[B1, … , Bn]A 
which indicates that A is derived on the condition [B1, … , Bn].9 The rules of the infer-
ence system are such that: ‘if [∆]A is derivable from a set of premises Γ then 
Γ  ∆  A.’ 
                                                     
7 Given the generality of Aliseda’s Fact 4, it cannot be held against us that we chose an example in which 
one of the premises is a tautology. 
8 On Aliseda’s procedures, any theory from which the explanandum is not derivable can be transformed into one 
that leads to atomic self-explanations: where ϕ is the explanandum, it suffices to add ϕ ∨ ∼ϕ to the theory. 
9 If the condition is empty (notation: [∅]A or simply A), A is said to be derived unconditionally. 
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A goal-directed proof starts with the introduction of the main goal by writing 
[G]G 
on the first line of the proof. This line is logically redundant but, as we shall see, 
guides the search procedure. The condition of [∆]A reminds us that these formulas 
have not yet been derived and that they should be derived in order to derive A. 
If G is a positive part of a premise A, it is allowed that A is entered in the proof and, 
if G is different from A, that A is analyzed. If G is not positive part of a premise, the 
condition of [G]G is analyzed in such a way that a set of new goals is obtained that 
will guide the search process. 
Inference systems satisfying this proof format allow for perspicuous and simple 
heuristics that warrant goal-directed and efficient proofs. However, in this introduc-
tion, we have to omit the discussion of the heuristics —we refer the reader to Batens 
and Provijn (2001) and to Meheus and Provijn (To Appear) for this. 
The goal-directed proof procedure also needs marking definitions. Lines in a proof 
are marked if some goal in the condition of that line is useless in order to derive the 
main goal or a derived goal.  
For a concise formulation of the positive part relation and the inference rules we dis-
tinguish between a- and b-formulas, based on a theme from Smullyan (1995). Let *A 
denote the ‘complement’ of A, viz. B if A has the form ∼B and ∼A otherwise. 
a a1 a2 b b1 b2
A ∧ B A B ∼(A ∧ B) *A *B 
A ≡ B A ⊃ B B ⊃ A ∼(A ≡ B) ∼(A ⊃ B) ∼(B ⊃ A) 
∼(A ∨ B) *A *B A ∨ B A B 
∼(A ⊃ B) A *B A ⊃ B *A B 
∼∼A A A    
The following clauses constitute a recursive definition of the positive part relation for 
propositional classical logic (henceforth CL): 
1. pp(A, A). 
2. pp(A, a) if pp(A, a1) or pp(A, a2). 
3. pp(A, b) if pp(A, b1) or pp(A, b2). 
4. pp(A, B) and pp(B, C ), then pp(A, C ). 
We now move to the instructions for CL.10 Two general restrictions have to be taken 
into account: 
R1 Formula analyzing rules are not applied on formulas introduced by the Goal rule. 
                                                     
10 For reasons of space, we present a version in which the instructions are immediately linked to the 
inference rules —see Batens (2003). This version is less deterministic than the one presented in Bat-
ens and Provijn (2001). 
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R2 No rule is applied to repeat a marked or unmarked line. 
The instruction Goal introduces the main goal in the proof: 
Goal Start a goal-directed proof with: 
  1  [G]G   Goal  
Premises are only introduced in the proof if a goal of an unmarked line is a posi-
tive part of it: 
Prem If A is a goal of an unmarked line, B ∈ Γ and pp(A, B), then one may add: 
  k B   Prem  
If a goal A is a positive part of a formula B that was introduced by Prem, the formula 
analyzing rules allow one to analyze B until [∆]A is derived on a line in the proof. The 
formula analyzing rules can be summarized as follows:11
 [∆]a  [∆]b 
[∆]a1 [∆]a2  [∆  {*b2}]b1 [∆  {*b1}]b2
The general form of the rules is [∆]A/[∆  ∆’]B. Their application is governed by the 
following instruction (in which R refers to the name of the analyzing rule):  
FAR If C is a goal of an unmarked line, [∆]A is the formula of an unmarked line i, 
[∆]A/[∆  ∆’]B is a formula analyzing rule, and pp(C, B), then one may add: 
  k [∆  ∆’]B  i R 
The names of the formula analyzing rules are †E, with † ∈{∧, ∨, ⊃, ∼, ≡} or ∼‡E with 
‡ ∈ {∧, ∨, ⊃, ≡}. 
If no goal is a positive part of a premise or an analyzed formula, the condition ana-
lyzing rules lead to the analysis of the available goals. These rules can be summarized as: 
 [∆  {a}]A  [∆  {b}]A 
[∆  {a1, a2}]A  [∆  {b1}]A [∆  {b2}]A 
The general form of the rules is [∆  {B}]A/[∆  ∆’]A . Their application is governed by: 
CAR If A is a goal of an unmarked line, [∆  {B}]A is the formula of an unmarked 
line i, [∆  {B}]A/[∆  ∆’]A is a condition analyzing rule, then one may add: 
  k [∆  ∆’]A  i R 
The names of the condition analyzing rules are equal to the names of the formula 
analyzing rules preceded by a C. 
As A ∨ ∼A is valid in CL, Excluded Middle allows for the elimination of certain 
goals by the following instruction: 
                                                     
11 If two formulas occur at the bottom line of a rule, both variants may be derived (separately) in the 
proof. 
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EM  If A is a goal of an unmarked line, [∆  {B}]A and [∆’  {∼B}]A are the re-
spective formulas of the unmarked lines i and j, and ∆ ⊆ ∆’ or ∆’ ⊆ ∆, then 
one may add: 
  k [∆  ∆’]A  i, j EM 
The instruction Transitivity allows both for the elimination of goals that are derived 
unconditionally and for the generation of alternative conditions (if the goals of a cer-
tain condition are themselves conditionally derived in the proof): 
Trans If A is a goal of an unmarked line, and [∆  {B}]A and [∆’]B are the respec-
tive formulas of the unmarked lines i and j, then one may add: 
  k [∆  ∆’]A  i, j TRANS 
As we are concerned here with the goal-directed generation of abductive explanations 
from consistent and finite premise sets, both the instruction for the application of Ex 
Falso Quodlibet (EFQ)12 and the restrictions for infinite premise sets can be skipped 
(see Batens and Provijn 2001). 
The last elements of the procedure are the marking definitions. For the current appli-
cation, there are three reasons for marking a line: redundancy, inconsistency and loops.  
A line on which [∆  ∆’]A has been derived is redundant and hence R-marked if 
[∆]A has been derived in the proof. Evidently, searching for the members of ∆’ is 
useless to obtain A. 
Definition 1 Line i on which [∆]A is derived, is R-marked on a stage of a proof if on that 
stage [∆’]A is derived and ∆’ ⊂ ∆. 
A condition contains a flat inconsistency if both A and ∼A occur in it. If the deri-
vation of G relies on the derivation of an inconsistency, the procedure of Batens and 
Provijn (2001) takes care of this by means of EFQ. As abductive explanations should 
not be generated by means of inconsistencies, lines of which the condition contains a 
flat inconsistency are I-marked. 
Definition 2 Line i on which [∆]A is derived, is I-marked if ∆ is flatly inconsistent. 
Lines on which [∆  {A}]A is derived can only lead to loops in the search process 
and are L-marked. This also indicates that the search process for A should be led by 
other conditions, if possible. 
Definition 3 Line i on which [∆]A is derived, is L-marked if A ∈ ∆, unless line i was intro-
duced by means of the Goal rule. 
A proof is finished whenever G is derived. A proof is stopped if it is finished or if no 
further instructions can be applied. 
                                                     
12 The instruction EFQ is completely isolated. Without it, a paraconsistent variant of the CL procedure is 
obtained —see Batens (To Appear). 
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4. Abduction through Goal-Directed Proofs 
Recognizing abductive solutions on the basis of goal-directed proofs is absolutely 
straightforward. Here are the definitions: 
Definition 4  Given a theory Θ and an explanandum ϕ, A is an atomic explanation for ϕ iff 
A is a literal and [A]ϕ is derived on an unmarked line (different from the goal line) in a proof for Θ  ϕ 
that is stopped but not finished. 
Definition 5  Given a theory Θ and an explanandum ϕ, A1 ∧ ... ∧ An is a conjunctive 
explanation for ϕ iff A1, ... , An are literals and [A1, ... , An]ϕ (n > 1) is derived on an un-
marked line in a proof for Θ  ϕ that is stopped but not finished. 
As is shown in Meheus and Provijn (To Appear), the requirement that the proof 
should be stopped but not finished warrants, together with the marking rules, that all ab-
ductive solutions that satisfy these definitions are explanatory (in the sense of Aliseda 2006, 
p. 74). That the proof should be stopped moreover warrants that all possible abductive 
solutions occur in the proof. In the above definitions, we assume, like Aliseda, that ϕ is a 
literal. However, as is shown in Meheus and Provijn (To Appear), the approach can easily 
be generalized to handle other forms of explananda. 
We shall now review the examples from Section 2 in terms of goal-directed proofs. All 
proofs are generated according to the heuristics discussed in Meheus and Provijn (to appear). 
The first example illustrates how goal-directed proofs warrant the non-redundancy of 
the abductive explanations. 
Example 1. Θ = {(( p ∧ q) ∧ r ) ⊃ s, (( p ∧ q) ∨ t ) ⊃ s} ϕ = s. 
1 [s]s     Goal  
2 (( p ∧ q) ∧ r ) ⊃ s   Prem  
3 [( p ∧ q) ∧ r]s   2 ⊃E  
4 [p ∧ q, r]s   3 C∧E  
5 [p, q, r]s   4 C∧E R 
6 (( p ∧ q) ∨ t ) ⊃ s   Prem  
7 [( p ∧ q) ∨ t ]s  6 ⊃E  
8 [p ∧ q]s   7 C∨E  
9 [t ]s    7 C∨E  
10 [p, q]s   8 C∧E  
At stage 10 of the proof, line 5 is R-marked and the proof is stopped. Hence, ( p ∧ q) 
∧ r is not retained as an explanation for s. 
On Aliseda’s method, the next two examples lead to inconsistent explanations. In 
the goal-directed proofs, the inconsistent explanations are either not generated or the 
lines on which they occur are I-marked. 
Example 2. Θ = {p ⊃ q, r ∨ s} ϕ = q. 
As both q and p are not a positive part of r ∨ s, the latter is never entered in the proof.  
Hence, [∼r, ∼s]q cannot be derived. 
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Example 3. Θ = {p ⊃ q, (r ∧ ∼r ) ⊃ q} ϕ = q. 
1 [q]q     Goal  
2 p ⊃ q    Prem  
3 [p]q    2 ⊃E  
4  (r ∧ ∼r) ⊃ q    Prem  
5 [r ∧ ∼r]q   4 ⊃E 
6 [r, ∼r]q   5 C∧E I 
As soon as line 6 is entered, it is I-marked. Hence, in the stopped proof, only p is re-
tained as an explanation for q. 
The final example illustrates how self-explanations are ruled out. 
Example 4.  Θ = {s ⊃ p, ( p ∧ (q ∨ r )) ⊃ s} ϕ = p. 
1 [p]p      Goal  
2 s ⊃ p    Prem  
3 [s]p    2 ⊃E 
4 ( p ∧ (q ∨ r )) ⊃ s   Prem  
5 [p ∧ (q ∨ r )]s   4 ⊃E  
6 [p, q ∨ r]s   5 C∧E  
7 [p, q ∨ r]p   3, 6 Trans L 
Some more lines may be added to this proof (depending on the heuristics followed). 
For instance, C∨E can be applied to line 6, and Trans to the resulting line and line 3. 
However, all these lines will be L-marked. Hence, the only explanation for p that is 
generated is s. 
5. Comparing the Two Methods 
Like tableaux, the goal-directed proofs presented here are essentially based on α- and β-
type transformation rules. Still, as we discuss in more length in Meheus and Provijn (To 
Appear), generating abductions on the basis of goal-directed proofs seem to have a 
number of advantages. First, the procedure is (in general) more efficient. One of the 
reasons for this is that only relevant premises are introduced in the proof.13 Next, prob-
lems of redundancy, irrelevance, inconsistency and (partial or total) self-explanations can 
be dealt with in a very efficient and transparent way. Finally, the format can easily be 
generalized to handle other kinds of abductive inference, such as the case in which the 
explanandum is not a literal, the case in which the explanandum is inconsistent with the 
theory (“abductive anomalies”), and the case in which the theory itself is inconsistent.14
                                                     
13 The conditions under which a premise is relevant in the search for an abductive explanation for an explanandum ϕ can 
be defined in a very precise way on the basis of goal-directed proofs —see Meheus and Provijn (To Appear). 
14 The last case is adequately handled by simply omitting the rule EFQ from the procedure (which is a quite un-
natural rule anyway). 
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A possible disadvantage of the goal-directed proofs is that we see no elegant way to 
handle Aliseda’s disjunctive explanations (although we should add that we are not en-
tirely convinced of the unrestricted way in which disjunctive abductions are generated in 
Aliseda’s tableaux either). Another advantage of tableaux is their graphical format (but 
see Batens (2006) for a diagrammatic representation of goal-directed proofs). 
There is a more philosophical reason why we think the comparison between the two 
methods is useful. Most of the problems that we discussed in Section 2 could be consid-
ered as cases in which something is ‘wrong’ with the background theory (it contains 
tautologies, or irrelevant premises, or redundant premises, etc.). And, as Aliseda ob-
serves on p. 117, one’s algorithm is not necessarily to be blamed for this: “Bad theories 
produce bad explanations”. Unfortunately, in this messy and complex world, with our 
limited cognitive capacities and limited resources, we often have to work with ‘bad theo-
ries’. The more a method safeguards us from deriving bad explanations from such theo-
ries the better, so it seems. At least, if the cost for doing so is not too high. 
This is the real discussion that we hope our comparison will contribute to. 
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